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							Abstract:	The	Rigidity	Thesis	states	 that	no	rigid	term	can	have	the	same	semantic	content	as	a	non-rigid	 one.	 Drawing	 on	 Dummett	 (1973,	 1991),	 Evans	 (1979,	 1982),	 and	 Lewis	(1980),	Stanley	(1997a,	1997b,	2002)	rejects	the	thesis	since	it	relies	on	an	illicit	identi-fication	of	compositional	semantic	content	and	the	content	of	assertion	(henceforth,	as-sertoric	content).		I	argue	that	Stanley’s	critique	of	the	Rigidity	Thesis	fails	since	it	plac-es	constraints	on	assertoric	content	that	cannot	be	satisfied	by	any	plausible	notion	of	content	appropriately	related	to	compositional	semantic	content.	For	similar	reasons,	I	also	 challenge	 a	 recent	 two-dimensionalist	 defense	 of	 Stanley	 by	 Ninan	 (2012).	 	 The	moral	is	far-reaching:	any	theory	that	invokes	a	distinction	between	semantic	and	asser-toric	contents	 is	unsatisfactory	unless	 it	can	plausibly	explain	the	connection	between	them.	
Keywords:	 semantic	 content;	 assertoric	 content;	 compositionality;	 intensional	 opera-tors;	rigidity;	two-dimensionalism.	 	
	 2	
0. Introduction		
The	Rigidity	Thesis	(RT)	is	the	claim	that	no	rigid	term	has	the	same	content	as	a	non-rigid	one.1	RT	requires	that	if	the	two	sentences	differ	only	insofar	as	one	contains	a	rig-id	term	where	the	other	contains	a	corresponding	non-rigid	one,	they	differ	in	content.		
Prima	facie,	the	thesis	is	corroborated	by	intuitions	about	the	modal	profiles	of	sentenc-es	containing	rigid	terms,	and	corresponding	non-rigid	ones.	Intuitively,	while	(1)	is	in-formative,	and	contingent	(false	in	some	circumstances),	(2)	is	trivially	true	and	neces-sary.	1. Aristotle	is	the	last	great	philosopher	of	the	antiquity.		2. Aristotle	is	Aristotle.		But	(1)	and	(2)	only	differ	insofar	as	one	contains	the	non-rigid	term	‘the	last	great	phi-losopher	of	the	antiquity’,	and	the	other	the	co-referring	rigid	one,	 ‘Aristotle’.	By	RT,	it	follows	they	have	different	contents,	which,	in	turn,	explains	why	they	intuitively	differ	in	modal	profiles.2		However,	other	examples	support	counter-intuitions.		Relative	to	a	context,	(3)	and	(4)	seem	to	communicate	the	same	content:	3. The	actual	author	of	Waverly,	if	there	is	(a	unique)	one,	is	Scott.		4. The	author	of	Waverly,	if	there	is	(a	unique)	one,	is	Scott.		What	you	would	learn	in	a	normal	conversation	from	(3)	–	the	recoverable	information	–	seems	exactly	what	you	would	learn	from	(4).	The	occurrence	of	‘actual’	seems	redun-dant.	 	But	(3)	contains	a	rigid,	while	(4)	a	corresponding	non-rigid,	 term.	 	By	RT,	they	differ	in	content,	and	so,	that	they	seem	to	communicate	the	same	content	is	puzzling.																																																										1	RT	goes	back	to	Kripke’s	(1980)	arguments	against	the	descriptivist	theory	of	names,	and	was	one	of	the	central	underlying	assumptions	in	the	anti-descriptivist	tradition.		
2	See	Kripke	(1980).	
3	Similar	considerations	are	in	Davis	&	Humberstone	(1980).	2	See	Kripke	(1980).	
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Following	Dummett	 (1973,	1991)	and	Evans	(1979,	1982),	Stanley	(1997a,	1997b,	2002)	argues	that	this	puzzle	rests	on	an	implicit	assumption	of	what	I	shall	call	Identifi-
cation:3	
(Identification):	 The	 compositional	 semantic	 content	 (henceforth,	 semantic	content)	of	a	sentence	S	of	a	 language	L	 in	a	context	c	=	 the	proposition	 that	a	normal	assertive	utterance	of	S	expresses	in	C	(its	assertoric	content,	for	short).	With	Dummett	and	Evans,	Stanley	rejects	Identification.4	He	is	drawing	on	an	argument	from	Kaplan	(1989)	and	Lewis	(1980),	both	of	whom,	starting	with	the	widely	held	as-sumption	that	the	objects	of	propositional	attitudes	are	propositions,5	argue	that	propo-
																																																								3	Similar	considerations	are	in	Davis	&	Humberstone	(1980).	
4	Ninan	(2010),	Rabern	(2012a,	2012b),	and	Yalcin	(2007,	2012,	2015)	have	all	recently	rejected	Identification,	albeit	not	only	for	reasons	about	rigidity	(though	Ninan	(2012)	defends	Stanley’s	argument	against	RT	 from	criticism	by	King	(2003,	2007)).	Others,	 such	as	Bach	(2003),	Borg	(2004),	Cappelen	and	Lepore	(2005),	as	well	as	some	Relevance	Theorists	(Sperber	and	Wilson,	1986)	have	also	argued	for	a	separation	of	compositional	semantic	content	from	assertoric	con-tent,	 though	 for	different	 reasons.	These	 critics	 are	guided	by	 the	belief	 that	 context	has	only	minimal	effects	on	compositional	semantic	content.	Although	my	focus	is	not	on	this	type	of	re-jection	of	Identification,	considerations	I	raise	provide	a	challenge	for	these	authors	as	well.		
5	This	 assumption	 is	 contested	 by	 contemporary	 relativists	 (e.g.	 Egan	 (2010)	 and	MacFarlane	(2005)),	who	 nevertheless	 endorse	 Identification,	 by	 virtue	 of	making	 the	 objects	 of	 the	 atti-tudes	non-propositional.	 It	has	also	been	contested	by	expressivists	(Yalcin,	2007,	2012),	who	deny	Identification.	Since	my	interests	here	will	be	only	with	a	(dis)analogy	between	Stanley’s	and	Lewis’	arguments,	and	its	bearing	on	the	Dummet-Evans-Stanley	rejection	of	Identification,	and	since	both	Stanley	and	Lewis	accept	the	assumption,	I	can	grant	it	for	the	sake	of	argument.		
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sitions	cannot	be	 the	compositional	 semantic	values	of	 sentences	on	occasions	of	use,	for	any	such	identification	would	violate	compositionality.6		In	 what	 follows,	 Section	 1	 presents	 an	 argument	 from	 Lewis	 (1980)	 and	 Kaplan	(1989)	 intended	 to	 establish	 that	 certain	 sentential	 operators,	 in	 particular,	 temporal	and	 locational	 ones,	 require	 attributing	 semantic	 contents	 to	 sentences	 (in	 a	 context)	that	 are	 ill-suited	 as	 objects	 of	 propositional	 attitudes.	 	 Lewis	 (1980)	 concluded	 that	these	operators	must	operate	on	 semantic,	but	not	assertoric,	 contents.	 (A	 similar	ar-gument	is	in	Kaplan	(1989).7)		Section	3	presents	Stanley’s	argument	that	modal	opera-tors	are	likewise	of	this	sort,	thereby	concluding	that	semantic,	but	not	assertoric,	con-tent	exemplifies	modal	properties.	Since	rigidity	 is	a	modal	property,	 it	 is	exemplified	only	by	semantic	content;8	two	sentences	differing	only	insofar	as	one	contains	a	rigid	
																																																								6	One	 cannot	 straightforwardly	 characterize	 Kaplan	 as	 rejecting	 Identification,	 since	 he	 often	speaks	of	semantic	content	as	 ‘what	 is	said’	not	only	in	a	technical,	but	also	in	a	pre-theoretic,	sense.	This	is	especially	pressing	since	he	motivates	his	account	by	drawing	on	intuitions	about	the	(pre-theoretic)	notion	of	what	is	said.	(See	Kaplan	1989,	pp.	489)	However,	Kaplan	also	rec-ognizes	 the	 tension	provoked	by	a	commitment	 to	 Identification,	and	his	main	argumentation	for	distinguishing	propositions	from	semantic	contents	is	present	in	Kaplan	(1989,	pp.	503-4).	Thus,	I	group	him	with	Lewis	for	simplicity,	but	add	a	caveat	that	there	is	tension	in	Kaplan	re-garding	Identification.			
7	Although,	 as	 noted	 earlier,	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 Kaplan	 actually	 denies	 Identification,	 is	more	complex.	Cf.	fn.	6.		
8	Thus,	insofar	as	one	agrees	that	we	have	direct	intuitions	about	rigidity	even	in	the	absence	of	an	explicit	modal	operator,	as	in	examples	such	as	(1)	and	(2),	these	intuitions	would	naturally	be	understood	as	tracking	semantic,	not	assertoric,	content.	Stanley	(1997a),	in	fact,	argues	that	these	intuitions	are	not	intuitions	about	assertoric	content.		
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term	and	the	other	a	corresponding	non-rigid	one	can	share	assertoric	content,	estab-lishing	that	RT	is	false.	The	 failure	of	 Identification	 is	 remarkable	because	most	 theorists	assume	 it	 to	ex-plain	how	communication	is	possible.		We	can	communicate	with	the	use	of	a	sentence	in	a	given	context	because	what	is	expressed	by	that	use	just	is	the	semantic	content	of	that	sentence	in	that	context.9		Thus,	a	failure	of	Identification	leaves	us	in	a	quandary	–	if	 semantic	content	 is	distinct	 from	assertoric	content,	 then	how	is	 the	assertoric	con-tent	of	an	utterance	determined	given	 its	semantic	content?	Section	2	presents	Leiws’	account	of	how	to	derive	assertoric	content	from	semantic	content,	but	Section	4,	on	the	contrary,	argues	Stanley	has	no	way	 to	 reestablish	 the	connection	via	Lewis’	 strategy,	and	surprisingly,	neither	can	the	recent	two-dimensionalist	reconstruction	of	Stanley’s	account	proposed	by	Ninan	 (2012)	 establish	 the	 connection.10		 	 Indeed,	 there	 is	 suffi-cient	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 there	 is	 no	 plausible	 and	 sufficiently	 constrained	way	 to	reestablish	 the	 connection	between	 the	 two	 levels	 of	 content	 for	 a	 Stanley-type	 view.	That	is	because,	as	I	will	argue,	there	is	no	plausible	notion	of	content	that	can	play	the	role	of	Stanley’s	assertoric	 contents,	 given	a	presumed	connection	between	assertoric	and	compositional	semantic	content.					
																																																								9	This	is,	of	course,	compatible	with	the	expressed	content	–	what	is	said	–	being	an	input	to	fur-ther	pragmatic	reasoning.		
10	That	 Stanley’s	 view	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 two-dimensionalist	 is	 suggested	 by	 King	 (2003,	2007)	as	well.	Stanley	(2002)	considers	this	interpretation,	but	does	not	explicitly	endorse	it.		
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1. The	Operator	Argument	 	
1.1. The	Operators	and	Compositional	Semantic	Content	Since	natural	 languages	in	general,	and	English	in	particular,	are	riddled	with	context-sensitivity,	sentences	express	semantic	content	only	relative	to	a	context,	where	a	con-text	is	usually	understood	as	a	location	(time,	world,	and	spatial	location)	of	the	utter-ance,	and	as	such,	it	comprises	parameters	and	features	that	help	determine	the	seman-tic	content	of	a	given	utterance.	 	According	to	the	picture	Lewis	 is	challenging,	 the	se-mantic	content	of	a	sentence	in	a	context	is	a	proposition.	A	sentence	is	true	in	a	context	c	 iff	 at	 c	 it	 expresses	 a	 true	 proposition.	 Since	 propositions	 are	 true/false	 relative	 to	worlds,	a	sentence	is	true	at	c	iff	the	proposition	it	expresses	in	c	is	true	relative	to	the	world	determined	by	 c	 (a.k.a.	 ‘the	world	of	 utterance’).	However,	 relativizing	 truth	 to	just	a	context,	Lewis	argues,	is	insufficient,11	since	the	truth	of	some	sentences	at	a	con-text	depends	on	the	truth	of	the	proposition	expressed	by	another	sentence	in	that	con-text,	relative	to	a	world	other	than	the	world	of	utterance.	For	example,	the	truth	of,	‘It	is	possible	 that	 there	are	 five	coins	 in	my	pocket,’	uttered	 in	c,	depends	on	whether	at	a	world	w′	accessible	from	the	world	of	utterance	wc,	the	proposition	expressed	by	‘There	are	five	coins	in	my	pocket’	in	c	is	true.12		The	point	is	that	sentential	operators	such	as	‘it	is	possible	that’	shift	the	world	pa-rameter	of	the	context.		A	sentence	containing	a	‘shifty’	operator	is	true	in	a	context	and	a	world	 of	 utterance	 iff	 the	 proposition	 expressed	 by	 the	 embedded	 sentence	 in	 that	context	is	true	relative	to	a	world(s)	other	than	the	world	of	utterance.	To	capture	that	the	truth	of	a	sentence	in	a	context	can	depend	on	the	truth	of	a	proposition	expressed	
																																																								11	This	idea	is,	of	course,	not	new	with	Lewis.	See	Kamp	(1971)	and	Kaplan	(1989).	
12	As	usual,	‘accessible’	worlds	are	determined	by	a	contextually	supplied	accessibility	relation.		
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by	another	 sentence	 in	 that	 context	 relative	 to	 a	world	other	than	 the	world	of	utter-ance,	truth	has	to	be	relativized	not	merely	to	contexts,	but	also	to	worlds.13				Following	Lewis,	call	an	n-tuple	of	parameters	of	a	context	that	can	be	shifted	in	this	manner	an	index.14	The	truth	of	sentences	(of	a	language	in	a	context)	can	then	be	rela-tivized	 to	 indices.	 	 So	 far,	 an	 index	need	only	 contain	a	 single	parameter	–	a	world.	A	sentence	S	of	L	is	true	relative	to	a	context	c	and	an	index	i	iff	the	proposition	expressed	by	S	in	L	at	c	is	true	relative	to	i.		We	define	the	truth	of	S	at	c	as:	S	is	true	at	c	iff	S	is	true	relative	to	c	and	the	index	determined	by	the	context	ic,	i.e.,	iff	the	proposition	expressed	by	S	at	c	maps	ic	to	true.15		To	see	Lewis’	argument	that,	given	certain	natural	language	operators,	the	semantic	content	 of	 a	 sentence	 cannot	 be	 a	 proposition	 (in	 the	 traditional	 sense),	 consider	 the	pair	(5)-(6):	5. Mary	is	drowsy.		6. From	time	to	time,	Mary	is	drowsy.		
																																																								13	Lewis	(1980)	denies	we	can	avoid	relativization	of	truth	to	worlds	by	making	the	truth-value	of	the	sentence	embedded	under	a	modal	operator	dependent	on	a	context	just	like	the	context	of	utterance	except	that	the	world	of	utterance	has	possibly	been	shifted.	He	argues	that	what	results	from	switching	just	one	parameter	of	a	context,	while	holding	other	parameters	fixed,	is	not	a	context.	Contexts	require	their	agent	to	be	located	at	a	world	of	utterance	at	a	time	of	ut-terance;	but	this	requirement	is	not	preserved	once	we	shift	a	world	of	a	context.	(‘Necessarily,	I	am	here	now’	is	false.)		
14Lewis’	index	is	Kaplan’s	(1989)	circumstance	of	evaluation.			
15	Since	(so	 far)	 indices	only	contain	a	world,	we	can	still	 treat	propositions	as	 functions	 from	worlds	to	truth-values.		
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Suppose	that,	syntactically,	‘from	time	to	time’	is	a	sentential	operator.16	Assuming,	(5)	and	(6)	are	uttered	in	the	same	context,	‘Mary	is	drowsy’	should	make	the	same	seman-tic	contribution	in	both.		Lewis’	initial	assumption,	per	reductio,	is	that	the	semantic	con-tent	a	sentence	expresses,	relative	to	a	context	of	utterance,	 is	a	proposition.	Then	(6)	intuitively	depends	for	its	truth	at	a	context	c	and	a	world	w,	on	the	truth	of	the	proposi-tion	expressed	by	‘Mary	is	drowsy’	in	c,	at	times	other	than	the	time	of	c.	However,	since,	on	the	standard	picture,	 the	truth-value	of	a	proposition	depends	only	on	worlds,	and	not	on	times,	‘Mary	is	drowsy,’	if	true	(in	a	context	and	a	world),	is	true	at	all	times.	But,	then,	the	semantic	contribution	of	‘from	time	to	time’	is	vacuous.	That	is,	(5)	should	ex-press	whatever	(6)	does,	and	(6)	should	be	true	(in	a	context,	at	a	world)	iff	(5)	is.			But	since	 ‘from	time	to	 time’	 is	not	 semantically	vacuous,	 the	semantic	content	of	 ‘Mary	 is	drowsy’	must	be,	or	determine,	a	function	from	worlds	and	times	to	truth-values.	Since,	propositions,	traditionally	construed,	are	not	functions	of	this	type,	they	cannot	be	the	semantic	content	(5)	contributes	to	(6).	But,	then,	to	hold	that	the	semantic	content	of	a	sentence	not	embedded	 under	a	 temporal	operator	 is	 still	 a	proposition	would	violate	compositionality,	since	then	the	semantic	content	of,	e.g.,	(6)	would	not	be	derived	as	a	function	of	the	semantic	contents	of	its	parts.	This	completes	Lewis’	argument.17		
																																																								16	Though	this	assumption	 is	controversial	(see	King	(2003)),	we	grant	 it	 for	 the	sake	of	argu-ment.		
17With	parallel	 arguments,	 Lewis	 argues	 (compositional)	 semantic	 contents	 should	 be	 (or	 de-termine)	not	only	functions	from	worlds	and	times	to	truth-values,	but	(at	least)	functions	from	worlds,	times,	locations	and	standards	of	precision	to	truth-values.		
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1.2. Operators	and	Assertoric	Content	The	kind	of	objects	suitable	 to	enter	semantic	composition	(assuming	with	Lewis	 that	these	determine	functions	from	richer	indices	to	truth-values)	is	not	suitable	to	play	the	role	 of	 objects	 of	 assertion	 and	 propositional	 attitudes.	 Lewis’	 thought	 is	 that,	 since	propositions	are	what	we	believe	and	assert,	and	since	propositions	do	not	enter	 into	semantic	 composition,	 semantic	 content	 cannot	 be	 assertoric	 content.	 And	 so,	 Lewis	concludes,	‘[I]t	would	be	a	convenience,	nothing	more,	if	we	could	take	the	proposition-al	content	of	a	sentence	in	a	context	as	its	semantic	value.	But	we	cannot.	The	proposi-tional	contents	of	sentences	do	not	obey	the	compositional	principle,	therefore	they	are	not	semantic	values.’	(Lewis,	1980;	pp.	39,	reprint)18	In	summary,	a	Lewis-style	argument	takes	the	following	general	form:	for	a	senten-tial	 operator	 O	 to	 have	 a	 non-vacuous	 semantic	 contribution,	 the	 semantic	 content	 it	
																																																								18	As	noted	above,	a	version	of	the	Operator	Argument	is	present	already	in	Kaplan	(1989),	who	also	 takes	 the	 semantic	 content	 of	 a	 sentence	 in	 a	 context	 to	 be	 (or	 to	 determine)	 a	 function	from	richer	 indices	 to	 truth-values.	Kaplan	 is	 likewise	 sensitive	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 such	semantic	values	might	not	be	suitable	as	the	objects	of	propositional	attitudes.	He	writes:	‘Technically,	we	must	note	 that	 intensional	operators	must,	 if	 they	are	not	 to	be	vacuous,	operate	on	contents	which	are	neutral	with	respect	to	 features	of	circumstance	the	operator	 is	 interested	 in.	Thus,	for	example,	if	we	take	the	content	of	S	to	be	(i)	[the	proposition	that	David	Kaplan	is	writing	at	10	a.m.	on	26	March	1977],	the	application	of	a	temporal	operator	to	such	a	content	would	have	no	effect;	the	operator	would	be	vacuous’	(pp.	503–4,	n.	28).	And,	‘[t]his	functional	notion	of	the	content	of	a	sentence	in	a	context	may	not,	because	of	the	neutrality	of	content	with	respect	to	time	and	place,	say,	exactly	correspond	to	the	classical	conception	of	a	proposition’	(p.	504).	As	noted	above,	it	is	less	clear	whether	these	considerations	ultimately	lead	Kaplan	to	reject	Identi-fication.	(Cf.	fn.	6.)	
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operates	on	cannot	be	specific	along	the	O	dimension,	on	pain	of	loss	of	compositionali-ty.	 Since	O’s	 contribution	 is	 not	 vacuous,	 semantic	 content	 is	 not	 specific	 along	 the	O	dimension.	However,	the	contents	of	beliefs	and	assertions	are	specific	along	the	O	di-mension.	Hence,	the	compositional	semantic	contents	are	not	the	contents	of	beliefs.19		Lewis	does	not	offer	an	 independent	argument	 for	 thinking	only	propositions,	and	not	semantic	contents	of	the	kind	he	advocates,	are	suitable	objects	of	propositional	at-titudes.20	He	takes	this	for	granted.	However,	there	are	familiar	arguments	for	this	view.																																																									19	Of	course,	one	could	deny	that	English,	 in	particular,	and	natural	 languages,	 in	general,	con-tain	temporal,	locational	and	other	types	of	intensional	operators	(except	perhaps	modal	ones).	In	fact,	a	growing	number	of	linguists	have	grown	dissatisfied	with	the	intensional	treatment	of	alleged	 temporal	 and	 locational	 operators.	 (See	King	 (2003)	 for	 arguments	 against	 the	 inten-sional	 treatment	 of	 tense	 and	 location.)	 An	 alternative	 treatment	might	 involve	 treating	 tem-poral	and	locational	expressions	as	quantifiers	over	times	and	locations	in	the	object-language,	rather	 than	 in	 the	meta-language.	 Going	 into	 the	 details	 of	 such	 extensional	 treatment	would	unnecessarily	 complicate	 our	 dialectic,	 since	 the	 distinction	 between	 semantic	 and	 assertoric	contents	 that	exactly	parallels	 the	distinction	made	by	Lewis	could	be	made	 in	an	extensional	framework	(Cf.	Ninan	2012;	Rabern	2012a,	2012b.),	and	the	disanalogy	I	want	to	draw	between	the	 Stanley-type	 argument	 and	 Lewis’	 argument	 could	 be	 drawn	 in	 a	 purely	 extensionalist	framework.	
20	In	fact,	in	‘Attitudes	De	Dicto	and	De	Se’,	published	a	year	before	‘Index,	Context	and	Content,’	Lewis	endorses	a	view	according	to	which	compositional	semantic	contents	(of	the	kind	he	en-dorses)	are	suitable	as	objects	of	the	attitudes.	This	view	rejects	not	the	claim	that	propositions	violate	compositionality,	but	rather	the	claim	that	propositions	are	the	objects	of	the	attitudes.	What’s	asserted	and	believed	on	this	type	of	account	is	(or	determines)	a	function	from	richer	indices	 (that	 contain	more	 than	 just	 a	world	 coordinate)	 to	 truth-values.	 Such	an	approach	 is	embraced	by	modern	relativists	(see,	e.g.,	Egan	(2010),	McFarlane	(2005)).	The	jury	is	still	out	
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One	might	think	that	while	compositional	semantic	contents	(of	the	Lewis	variety)	vary	in	 truth-value	 (at	 least)	with	 times	and	 locations	 in	addition	 to	worlds,	beliefs	do	not	share	this	feature.	The	contents	of	our	beliefs	(and	assertions)	are	not	time-	or	location-neutral;	our	beliefs	don’t	seem	to	change	truth-value	with	times	and	locations.		To	illus-trate	the	type	of	argument	those	attracted	to	this	view	advance,	suppose	that	on	April	15th,	2015,	 it	 is	raining,	and	I	believe	and	say	that	 it	 is	raining.	 	The	argument	goes,	 it	would	seem	false	to	say	on	April	16th,	2015,	that	what	I	believed	and	said	yesterday	is	false.	You	cannot	challenge	me	on	April	16th,	2015,	by	saying:	‘Yesterday	you	said	some-thing	false’.		And	parallel	arguments	can	be	constructed	against	the	idea	that	assertoric	contents	vary	in	truth	with	location.	Sitting	in	my	office,	I	believe,	and	I	say	to	you,	that	the	North	Pole	is	3428.72mi	away.	Once	at	the	North	Pole,	it	would	be	odd	for	me	to	say	what	I	believed	in	my	office	is	false.	And	it	would	be	odd	for	you	to	challenge	me	by	say-ing:	‘Back	in	your	office,	you	said	something	false’.21			Of	course,	other	examples	in	the	literature	pull	intuition	in	the	opposite	direction.	I	do	not	here	wish	to	assess	the	success	of	such	arguments,	or	take	a	stand	on	the	nature	of	the	objects	of	propositional	attitudes.	That	is	a	topic	for	another	day.		My	present	in-terest	is	the	analogy	between	Lewis-type	and	Stanley-type	arguments.		Thus,	my	strate-gy	will	be	to	grant,	for	the	sake	of	argument,	that	semantic	content	is	as	Lewis	takes	it	to	be,	and	that	assertoric	content	is	also	as	he	takes	it	to	be.	I	will	show	that,	while	there	is	still,	as	Lewis	argues,	a	clear	connection	between	the	two	levels	of	content	in	the	Lewis-
																																																																																																																																																																												on	whether	this	kind	of	object	is	suitable	to	play	the	role	of	an	object	of	assertion	and	proposi-tional	attitudes.	I	will	not	pursue	this	 issue	here,	since	the	only	thing	that	matters	for	my	pur-poses	is	the	analogy	between	the	Lewis-type	and	the	Stanley-type	arguments.	
21	For	arguments	along	these	lines,	see	Richard	(1981)	and	Salmon	(2003).		
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type	 case,	 the	 connection	does	not	 carry	 over	 to	what	would	have	 to	 be	 Stanley-type	contents.			
2. The	Connection	A	 semantic	 theory	 without	 any	 connection	 between	 assertoric	 and	 semantic	 content	would	leave	unexplained	how	by	making	an	assertion,	a	speaker	manages	to	convey	in-formation	to	others	or	to	modify	their	beliefs	in	a	more	or	less	systematic	way.	Without	an	account	of	how	semantic	 content	can	play	a	 role	 in	 fixing	assertoric	 content,	 it	be-comes	an	 idle	wheel	 in	 a	 theory	of	 communication,	 and	how	assertoric	 content	 is	 ex-pressed	becomes	completely	mysterious.	Moreover,	a	chief	reason	 for	a	compositional	semantics	 is	 to	 explain	 how	 language	 users	 can	 understand	 and	 produce	 indefinitely	many	novel	sentences.	Yet,	since	compositionality	only	governs	semantic	content,	with-out	a	clear	connection	between	semantic	and	assertoric	content,	these	capacities	would	be	mysterious,	and	left	unexplained	by	appeals	to	compositionality	of	semantic	content.		Luckily,	recovering	assertoric	from	semantic	content	is	easy	for	Lewis	(and	Kaplan).	To	see	how,	represent	the	semantic	content	of	an	utterance	of	a	(unembedded)	sentence	𝜑	in	a	context	c	as	follows:	
SC-L:		 	 	 𝜆𝑤. 𝜆𝑡. 𝜆𝑙. 𝜑 !, !,!,! 	where	c	 is	the	context,	and	 𝑤, 𝑡, 𝑙 	an	index	(where	𝑤, 𝑡 and	𝑙	are	world,	time	and	loca-tion	parameters,	 respectively).22	According	 to	SC-L,	 the	 semantic	 content	of	𝜑	in	 c	 is	 a	function	 from	possible	worlds,	 times	 and	 locations	 to	 extensions	 –	 here,	 truth-values.	The	assertoric	content	is	then	easily	recovered	by	letting	the	context	‘fix’,	i.e.,	supply	the	location	and	time	parameter.	Thus	the	assertoric	content	for	Lewis	is	AC-L:	
																																																								22	I	take	‘  ’	to	denote	an	interpretation	function	of	the	model	that	takes	an	expression,	a	con-text,	an	 index	and	an	assignment	 function	 to	extensions.	For	simplicity,	 I	 suppress	 the	assign-
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AC-L:	 	 	 𝜆𝑤. 𝜑 !, !,!!,!! 	where	𝑡! , 𝑙! 	are	the	time	and	location	parameters	fixed	by	context	c.	The	function	in	AC-
L	takes	a	possible	world	and	returns	a	truth-value.		That	is,	it	is	a	good	old	proposition.		Lewis’	 lesson	is	that,	although	semantic	and	assertoric	contents	do	not	coincide	on	his	 story,	 semantic	 content	 nevertheless	 determines	 assertoric	 content,	 since,	 given	 a	semantic	content,	we	can	recover	the	assertoric	content	by	letting	the	context	saturate	the	 time,	 location	 and	possibly	 other	 parameters	 of	 the	 index.	 Thus,	 a	 Lewis-type	 ac-count	does	not	 leave	mysterious	how	we	get	such	content	across.	 	We	turn	directly	to	Stanley’s	analogy.		
3. Assertoric	Content,	Semantic	Content	and	Rigidity	As	noted	above,	Stanley	(following	Evans	and	Dummett)	differentiates	assertoric	 from	semantic	content	for	reasons	distinct	from	those	in	Lewis	and	Kaplan.	His	goal	is	to	chal-lenge	RT.	His	main	argument	can	be	sketched	as	follows:	pairs	of	sentences	like	(3)–(4),	(repeated	below	as	(7)	and	(8))	differ	only	insofar	as	one	contains	a	non-rigid	term,	and	the	other	a	corresponding	rigid	one,	yet	both	typically	seem	to	communicate	the	same	content	relative	to	the	same	context.	7. The	actual	author	of	Waverly,	if	there	is	(a	unique)	one,	is	Scott.		8. The	author	of	Waverly,	if	there	is	(a	unique)	one,	is	Scott.																																																																																																																																																																														ment	 function	 argument	 throughout.	 Note	 that	 one	 could	 argue	 against	 Identification	 on	 the	grounds	that	the	standard	semantics	for	quantification	and	variable	binding	would	require	se-mantic	contents	to	vary	in	truth-value	with	assignment	functions	(that	quantifiers	operate	on),	whereas	 assertoric	 contents	 are	 typically	 not	 taken	 to	 be	 variable	 in	 this	 way	 (see	 Rabern	(2012a,	2012b)).	Even	if	this	is	right,	 importantly	note	that	one	can	establish	a	connection	be-tween	 the	 two	 types	 of	 content	 in	 a	 Lewisean	way	by	 saturating	 the	 assignment	 function	pa-rameter	with	a	contextually	supplied	value.		
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Indeed,	in	any	context,	(7)	is	true	just	in	case	(8)	is.	But,	nevertheless,	they	manifest	dis-tinct	behavior	when	embedded	under	modal	operators,	e.g.,	(9)	is	true	and	(10)	is	false:	9. Necessarily,	the	actual	author	of	Waverly,	if	there	is	(a	unique)	one,	is	Scott.		10. Necessarily,	the	author	of	Waverly,	if	there	is	(a	unique)	one,	is	Scott.		The	actual	author	of	Waverly	(i.e.	Scott)	could	not	have	failed	to	be	Scott,	but	Scott	might	not	 have	 authored	Waverly.	 Similar	 considerations,	 Stanley	 argues,	 hold	 for	 so-called	
descriptive	proper	names.	 Suppose	 ‘Julius’	has	been	 introduced	 into	 the	 language	via	a	reference	fixing	description	(S):	(S)	‘Julius’	refers	to	whoever	invented	the	zip.		Suppose	 further	 with	 Stanley	 that	 linguistic	 competence	 with	 ‘Julius’	 presupposes	knowledge	of	(S).23	Then	consider	(11)–(12):		11. 	Julius	invented	the	zip,	if	anyone	uniquely	did.		12. The	inventor	of	the	zip	invented	the	zip,	if	anyone	uniquely	did.		As	with	 (7)–(8),	 uttered	 in	 the	 same	 context,	 assuming	 competence	with	 ‘Julius’,	 (11)	and	(12)	communicate	the	same	thing.	Further,	assuming,	as	Stanley	does,	that	compe-tence	with	‘Julius’	requires	knowledge	of	(S),	in	every	context	in	which	interlocutors	are	competent	with	‘Julius’,	(11)	is	true	just	in	case	(12)	is.		However,	just	as	(7)	and	(8)	exhibit	different	modal	profiles,	so	too	do	(11)	and	(12),	as	evidenced	in	(13)-(14):	13. Necessarily,	Julius	invented	the	zip,	if	anyone	uniquely	did.		14. Necessarily,	the	inventor	of	the	zip	invented	the	zip,	if	anyone	uniquely	did.		(13)	is	false	and	(14)	true.24		
																																																								23	This	is	not	a	completely	innocuous	assumption,	but	I	grant	it	for	the	sake	of	argument.	
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Again,	(11)	and	(12)	differ	only	insofar	as	one	contains	a	rigid,	and	the	other	a	corre-sponding	 non-rigid,	 expression.	 So,	 RT	 predicts	 they	 cannot	 have	 the	 same	 semantic	content.	And,	 indeed,	the	difference	in	modal	profiles	of	(7)–(8)	and	(11)–(12)	has	led	many	(indeed,	most)	authors	to	conclude	that	neither	(7)–(8)	nor	(11)–(12)	share	con-tent.			Stanley,	 however,	 resists	 this	 conclusion,	 arguing	 that	 it	 rests	on	 the	unwarranted	assumption	of	Identification.	Following	Lewis	that	temporal	and	locational	operators	do	not	operate	on	assertoric	content,	but	on	semantic	contents,	Stanley	argues	that	modal	operators	likewise	do	not	operate	on	assetoric	contents,	but	on	semantic	contents.25		He	thereby	recommends	the	following	explanation	of	the	data	in	(7)–(8):	(7)	and	(8)	share	assertoric	content,	but	differ	in	compositional	semantic	content.	Because	modal	opera-tors	 operate	 on	 compositional	 semantic	 values,	 (7)	 and	 (8)	 exhibit	 different	 behavior	when	embedded	under	modal	operators.		That	(7)–(8)	share	assertoric	content	explains	why	they	seem	to	express	the	same	content	with	respect	to	the	same	contexts;	that	they	differ	on	semantic	content	explains	why	they	behave	differently	when	embedded	under	modal	operators.26	Mutatis	mutandis	 for	 (11)–(12).	Thus,	by	drawing	a	distinction	be-tween	assertoric	and	compositional	semantic	contents,	Stanley	seems	to	get	the	best	of	both	worlds.	 However,	 once	 Stanley	 draws	 a	 distinction	 between	 these	 two	 levels	 of	content,	he	needs	to	tell	us	how	to	connect	assertoric	content	to	semantic	content.	 	
																																																																																																																																																																												24	Similar	examples	are	used	to	motivate	the	distinction	between	semantic	and	assertoric	con-tent	in	Dummett	(1973,	1991),	Davis	and	Humberstone	(1980)	and	Evans	(1979,	1982).	
25	This	line	of	thought	is	challenged	by	King	(2003,	2007).	He	argues	the	analogy	is	unwarrant-ed,	since	intensional	treatments	of	temporal	and	location	expressions	are	mistaken.	Prima	facie,	if	King	is	right,	that	would	seem	to	undermine	Lewis’	argument.	However,	Rabern	(2012b)	re-
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4. (Dis)connection			
According	to	Lewis,	we	need	to	distinguish	between	two	types	of	content	because	con-tents	 that	 only	 vary	 in	 truth-value	 with	 worlds,	 but	 not	 times	 and	 locations,	 violate	compositionality.	Since	assertoric	contents,	that	is,	for	Lewis,	propositions,	only	vary	in	truth-value	with	worlds,	it	follows	that	they	cannot	be	compositional	semantic	contents.	Stanley,	we	saw,	 inspired	by	Lewis,	 concludes	 that	modals	also	are	 intensional	opera-tors	operating	on	semantic,	but	not	assertoric,	 contents.	But	how	does	he	account	 for	the	connection	between	them?																																																																																																																																																																														cently	argued	that	even	if	we	assume	an	extensional	framework,	propositions	(traditionally	un-derstood)	would	still	not	be	able	to	play	the	role	of	compositional	semantic	values.	Thus,	if	Rab-ern	is	right,	even	if	Lewis	is	wrong	about	the	nature	of	temporal	and	locational	expressions,	we	might	still	be	forced	to	draw	the	distinction	between	the	two	types	of	content	for	purely	formal	reasons	(though,	granted,	not	for	reasons	Stanley	cites).	One	could	then	reconstruct	the	dialectic	in	an	extensional	framework.		
26	As	Stanley	points	out,	it’s	easy	to	find	pairs	of	sentences	that	seem	to	convey	the	same	content	relative	to	the	same	context,	yet	behave	differently	when	embedded	under	temporal	and	loca-tional	operators.	Here’s	one	example:	(a) The	Olympic	champion	in	show	jumping	is	Steve	Guerdat.		(b) The	current	Olympic	champion	in	show	jumping	is	Steve	Guerdat.	(c) It	 will	 always	 be	 the	 case	 that	 the	 Olympic	 champion	 in	 show	 jumping	 is	 Steve	Guerdat.		(d) It	will	always	be	the	case	that	the	current	Olympic	champion	in	show	jumping	is	Ste-ve	Guerdat.	Stanley	 takes	 these	data	 to	 further	support	extending	Lewis’	 treatment	of	 locational	and	 tem-poral	operators,	to	modal	operators.	
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He	can	take	semantic	content	to	be	Lewis’	SC-L,	i.e.	a	function	from	times,	locations	and	worlds	to	truth-values,	reflecting	that	temporal,	locational	and	modal	operators	can	shift	the	relevant	parameters	of	the	context.27	Or,	ignoring	the	time	and	location	param-eters,	for	simplicity,	he	can	take	it	to	be	SC-S:	a	function	from	worlds	to	truth-values.	
SC-S:	 	 	 𝜆𝑤. 𝜑 !, ! 	But,	 on	 either	 route,	 a	 crucial	 disanalogy	 between	 Stanley	 and	 Lewis	 emerges.	 Given	Stanley’s	data,	assertoric	content	must	be	world	specific,	because	 ‘the	actual	author	of	
Waverly’	and	‘the	author	of	Waverly’,	relative	to	different	worlds,	have	different	exten-sions	(the	former	is	rigid,	the	latter	is	not).	The	truth-value	of	Stanley’s	assertoric	con-tent,	then,	cannot	vary	with	worlds.		So,	given	his	data,	Stanley	needs	to	retrieve	the	assertoric	content	that	does	not	vary	in	truth-value	with	worlds,	from	the	world	natural	semantic	content	in	SC-S;	following	Lewis’	 strategy	 he	would	 let	 the	world	 parameter	 of	 the	 index	 be	 determined	 by	 the	context,	as	in	AC-S:	
AC-S:	 	 		 	 𝜑 !, !! 	But	AC-S	cannot	play	the	role	of	assertoric	content.	Since	SC-S	is	a	function	from	worlds	to	 truth-values,	 once	we	 saturate	 the	world	 argument	 of	 the	 function	 SC-S,	 we	 get	 a	truth-value.	AC-S	is	just	a	truth-value.	The	objects	of	assertion	and	belief	are	supposed	to	be	the	bearers	of	truth-values,	not	the	truth-values	themselves.		Distinctions	between	different	 beliefs	 and	 assertions	 are	 too	 fine-grained	 to	 be	 captured	 by	 truth-values.28	
																																																								27	Bear	in	mind,	Stanley	grants	that	the	time-neutral	and	location-neutral	contents	cannot	figure	as	assertoric	contents.	
28Of	course,	the	same	point	holds	if	we	saturate	all	three	of	the	parameters	in	SC-L—a	world,	a	time	and	a	location—with	a	contextually	supplied	value:	we	just	get	a	truth-value.	In	that	sense,	
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Indeed	according	to	this	account	of	assertoric	content	there	can	be	at	most	two	beliefs:	the	True	and	the	False.	So,	Lewis’	way	of	accounting	for	the	connection	between	the	two	types	of	content	automatically	fails.	The	failure	of	extending	Lewis’	strategy	to	Stanley’s	account	is	instructive.	It	shows	that	Lewis’	 assertoric	 contents	 cannot	be	Stanley’s,	 for	 the	 former	vary	 in	 truth-value	with	worlds	in	a	way	that	Stanley’s	cannot.	So,	assertoric	content	cannot	be	AS-C.29	Al-ternatively,	Stanley	might	 try	 to	 treat	assertoric	contents	as	structured	propositions—complex	 structured	 entities—rather	 than	 as	 functions	 from	 worlds	 to	 truth-values.30	But	 fine-grained	 structured	 contents	 are	 not	 retrievable	 by	 SC-S.	 SC-S	 is	 too	 course-grained	 to	 deliver	 the	 relevant	 structured	 content;	 so,	 if	 this	 view	 is	 to	 get	 off	 the	
																																																																																																																																																																												it	makes	no	difference	whether	we	are	working	with	SC-L,	or	the	simplified	SC-S.	For	the	record,	it	wouldn’t	help	to	try	to	recover	the	assertoric	content	from	SC-L	by	letting	the	context	saturate	only	the	world	parameter	of	the	index,	but	not	the	time,	and	location	parameters.	Such	objects	would	fail	to	properly	capture	the	truth-conditions	of	a	sentence,	which	is	something	objects	of	assertion	and	belief	are	required	to	do.	
29	Note,	it	wouldn’t	help	to	argue	that	assertoric	content	is	recoverable	from	the	semantic	con-tent	by	some	kind	of	pragmatic	enrichment,	where	semantic	content	 is	understood	as	SC-S	or	
SC-L.	A	standard	variety	of	pragmatic	enrichment	takes	the	form	of	saturation	of	the	functions	that	are	semantic	values	–	and	it	looks	like,	for	the	reasons	given	above,	what	results	from	such	an	enrichment	of	SC-S	is	a	truth-value,	rather	than	an	entity	suitable	to	be	an	object	of	assertion	or	belief.	Thus,	 insofar	 as	 enrichment	has	 to	deliver	 a	world-specific	 semantic	 value,	 it	would	run	into	the	same	problem	as	Lewis’	strategy.	Moreover,	SC-S	is	neither	“gappy”	nor	in	need	of	expansion,	so	it	isn’t	clear	what	would	trigger	enrichment.		
30	See,	 e.g.,	 King	 (1995,	 1996,	 2007),	 Salmon	 (1986,	 1989)	 and	 Soames	 (1986,	 2010)	 for	structured	accounts	of	semantic	content.	
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ground,	 we	would	 also	 have	 to	 replace	 SC-S,	 a	 function	 from	 indices	 to	 truth-values,	with	structured	contents—complex	entities	comprised	of	semantic	contributions	(in	a	given	 context)	 of	 parts	 of	 sentences	 expressing	 them	 (in	 that	 context).31	That	 is,	 we	could	take	both	the	assertoric	and	semantic	contents	of	sentences	(relative	to	contexts)	to	be	structured	propositions.		But,	 this	 move,	 unfortunately,	 will	 not	 improve	 Stanley’s	 position.	 The	 problem	with	employing	structured	propositions	to	try	to	forge	a	connection	between	semantic	and	assertoric	contents	is	that	structured	semantic	values	are	not	compositional	in	Lew-is’	sense,	since	they	do	not	compose	in	a	function-argument	way	with	operators,	and	so,	no	significant	semantic	composition	occurs	with	them.	The	result	of	appending	an	oper-ator	to	a	structured	content	is	another	structured	content.	In	a	framework	that	employs	structured	contents	as	 semantic	values,	 compositionality	enters	 in	only	at	 the	 level	of	the	truth-definition	for	structured	contents,	not	at	the	level	of	semantic	contents	them-selves.32	Structured	fine-grained	semantic	values	are	not	compositional	semantic	values	in	the	sense	meant	by	Lewis.	Thus,	this	route	is	a	dead	end	for	proponents	of	the	distinc-tion	between	assertoric	and	semantic	content.33																																																											31	There	is	a	further	question	of	what	gives	structured	propositions	their	structure.	See	e.g.	King	(2007)	for	a	positive	proposal	and	a	further	discussion.	
32	For	a	helpful	discussion	see	King	(2007,	pp.	113	and	onwards).		
33Note	that	even	if	it	weren’t	for	this	problem,	the	view	would	still	face	problems.		The	view	still	needs	to	deliver	world-specific	assertoric	contents	and	world-neutral	semantic	contents.	A	way	to	do	this	 is	to	posit	that	structured	propositions	that	play	the	role	of	assertoric	contents	con-tain	the	world	of	utterance	as	a	part,	and	the	ones	that	play	the	role	of	semantic	content	do	not.		The	most	straightforward	way	to	achieve	this	effect	is	to	posit	a	world	variable	in	the	LF	of	sen-tences	 and	 an	 obligatory	wide-scope	 lambda	binder	 that	 binds	 all	 free	world	 variables	 in	 the	
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Recently,	Ninan	 (2012)	has	defended	a	 two-dimensionalist	version	of	Stanley’s	ar-gument	 against	 RT.	 According	 to	 two-dimensionalist	 accounts,	 each	 sentence	 S	 is	 se-mantically	associated	with	 two	semantic	values	–	 the	horizontal	content	(the	proposi-tion	S	expresses	at	a	context	c),	and	the	diagonal	content	(the	proposition	that	is	true	in	a	world	𝑤	just	 in	 case,	when	uttered	 in	𝑤,	 S	would	express	a	 true	proposition	 in	𝑤).34		The	idea	is	that	the	horizontal	content	tracks	the	modal	profile	of	an	utterance	and	the	diagonal	content	 tracks	the	 information	 it	communicates	relative	to	a	context.	So	con-strued,	semantic	content	 is	 identified	with	 the	 former,	and	assertoric	content	with	 the	
																																																																																																																																																																												structure	 (where	 modal	 operators	 would	 then	 be	 treated	 extensionally,	 as	 quantifiers	 over	worlds).	Such	LFs	then	determine	the	compositional	semantic	content	of	sentences.	The	asser-toric	content	would	be	generated	by	saturating	the	world	variable	in	the	LF	with	a	contextually	supplied	world.	(For	this	way	of	constructing	world	neutral	vs.	world	specific	structured	propo-sitions,	see	Schaffer	(2012).	Yet	Schaffer	does	not	suggest	 that	we	should	exploit	either	of	 the	two	contents	as	semantic	or	assertoric	content.)		Note	that	on	this	view,	however,	the	semantic	content	of	an	unembedded	sentence	again	is	not	what	it	contributes	to	composition	with	modal	operators—this	strategy	 is	more	akin	 to	what	Lewis	calls	 “the	schmentencite	 strategy”	(Lewis,	1980).	Moreover,	apart	from	this	problem,	the	view	wouldn’t	be	deriving	the	structured	seman-tic	content	from	the	structured	assertoric	content—it	would	posit	two	structured	contents	with	different	elements	derived	from	the	LF	of	the	sentence	in	question.	Note	also	that	no	structured	account	that	tries	to	derive	(structured)	assertoric	content	from	(structured)	semantic	content	by	some	kind	of	pragmatic	 free	enrichment	would	help	Stanley,	 since	 the	semantic	content	of	Stanley’s	 kind	 is	 neither	 ‘gappy’,	 nor	 in	 need	 of	 expansion	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 truth-conditions.		
34	Stanley	himself	suggests	that	one	way	to	understand	assertoric	content	is	as	a	diagonal	prop-osition	(cf.	Stanley	2002).	This	is	also	suggested	by	King	(2003).		
	 21	
latter.35		This	seems	to	capture	Stanley’s	data—namely,	that	(3)–(4)	share	diagonal	con-tent,	 but	 not	 horizontal	 content,	 and,	 assuming	 competence	 with	 a	 name	 like	 ‘Julius’	presupposes	knowledge	of	(S),	(7)–(8)	does,	too.		Unfortunately,	as	stated,	this	proposal	also	does	not	establish	a	connection	between	semantic	 and	 assertoric	 content.	 On	 it,	 semantic	 content	 doesn’t	determine	 assertoric	content.	The	account	just	assigns	two	levels	of	content	to	each	utterance.	More	serious-ly,	diagonal	content	is	not	suited	to	play	the	role	of	assertoric	content	in	all	the	relevant	cases.	The	problem	is	familiar	(Soames	2002).	Were	diagonal	content	the	object	of	be-liefs	 and	 assertions,	 then	 propositional	 attitudes	would	 relate	 individuals	 to	 diagonal	contents.	And	propositional	attitude	reports	would	express	relations	between	individu-als	and	diagonal	 contents.	But,	 then,	 it	would	be	natural	 to	hold	 that	ascription	 ‘S	be-lieves	that	p’	 is	true	in	c	iff	S	believes	the	diagonal	content	of	 ‘p’	 in	c.	But	this	result	is	problematic.	For	suppose	Mary	believes	that	Jason	is	angry.	Then,	Jason,	knowing	this,	can	report:	‘Mary	believes	that	I	am	angry’.	However,	according	to	the	present	proposal,																																																									35	I	am	simplifying.	The	question	is	whether	we	want	to	side	with	Lewis	in	relativizing	truth	to	other	parameters	in	addition	to	the	world	parameter	of	the	index.	In	that	case,	neither	diagonal	content	nor	horizontal	content	(if	we	take	them	to	be	traditional	propositions,	rather	then	func-tions	 from	 richer	 indices)	 would	 strictly	 speaking	 be	 compositional.	 This	 would	 complicate	Stanley’s	story	and	make	the	disanalogy	with	Lewis	ever	more	striking	–	for	to	get	at	these	con-tents	we	would	first	have	to	saturate	the	additional	parameters	in	the	index.	Moreover,	though	this	proposal,	unlike	the	previous	ones,	opens	the	possibility	for	Stanley	to	claim	assertoric	con-tent	 is	 essentially	 propositional	 content,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 on	 the	most	 developed	 two-dimensional	 stories,	 the	 diagonal	 is	 not	 a	 possible	 worlds	 proposition,	 but	 a	 set	 of	 centered	worlds	(ordered	triples	of	a	world,	an	individual	and	a	time	in	that	world).	(See	Chalmers	(2004,	2006a,	2006b).)	
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his	report	comes	out	false	–	the	diagonal	proposition	expressed	by	Jason’s	utterance	of	‘I	am	angry’	is	not	a	proposition	about	Jason.	It	is	something	like	the	general	descriptive	proposition	that	 the	agent	of	 the	context,	whoever	s/he	 is,	 is	angry.	And	this	does	not	capture	the	content	of	the	belief,	which	is	a	singular	proposition	about	Jason.	This	prob-lem	 has	 been	 well	 recognized	 by	 both	 proponents	 and	 opponents	 of	 two-dimensionalism.	(See	Chalmers	(2006b)	and	Soames	(2002).)		Note	that,	though	often	stated	this	way,	the	problem	does	not	depend	on	the	seman-tics	of	propositional	attitude	reports.	Here’s	another	way	to	see	it.	If	Jason	utters,	‘I	am	in	NJ’,	and	I	follow	up	with	‘That’s	false’	or	‘What	Jason	said	is	false’,	I’m	intuitively	deny-ing	the	truth	of	a	singular	proposition	about	Jason,	not	a	general	one	about	speakers	in	context,	which	would	be	so	were	the	asserted	content	the	diagonal	content.	Similarly,	if	Jason	says	‘I	am	here	now’	and	I	follow	up	with	‘That’s	necessarily	true’,	or	‘What	Jason	said	is	necessarily	true’,	 intuitively	what	I	said	is	false,	which	shouldn’t	be	so	were	the	propositional	 anaphor	 picking	 up	 the	 diagonal,	 rather	 then	 the	 horizontal,	 content.36	Thus,	identifying	compositional	semantic	contents	with	horizontal	contents,	and	asser-
																																																								36	Note	that	though	a	two-dimensionalist	can	claim	modal	operators	operate	on	horizontal,	and	not	diagonal,	content,	here	we	have	a	predication	of	necessary	truth,	rather	then	a	sentnece	em-bedded	under	a	modal	operator.	Of	course,	one	might	 insist	 that	 the	propositional	anaphor	 in	such	 examples	 is	 obligatorily	 picking	 out	 semantic,	 rather	 than	 assertoric,	 contents,	 but	 then	there	should	be	an	explanation	for	why	this	is	so.	The	problem	is	especially	pressing	since	‘That	is	true/false’	or	‘What	x	said	is	true/false’	are	normally	taken	to	target	assertoric,	not	semantic,	content.		One	could	also	claim	propositional	anaphors	target	either	of	two	contents	(semantic	or	assertoric),	but	then	one	would	have	to	explain	why	we	only	get	one	reading	of	‘What	Jason	said	is	necessarily	true’	in	the	above	example,	moreover,	one	that	is	false	rather	than	one	that	is	true.		
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toric	contents	with	diagonal	contents	doesn’t	work.37		Taking	stock,	assertoric	content	can	be	neither	a	diagonal	proposition,	nor	a	horizontal	one,	nor	a	structured	one,	if	se-mantic	content	is	to	determine	assertoric	content.	Do	any	options	remain	open?		 One	possible	reaction	 is	 to	build	a	structured	semantic	content	and	 include	all	 the	relevant	information.	That	is,	fix	the	semantic	value	of	a	sentence	relative	to	a	context	to	be	a	structured	n-tuple	that	includes	as	a	constituent	its	semantic	content,	in	the	tech-nical	sense	discussed,	as	well	as	assertoric	content	(see	Chalmers	2011).		In	short,	this	proposal	‘generalizes	to	the	worst	case’,	by	assigning	a	very	fine-grained	semantic	value	to	a	sentence	relative	to	a	context,	but	one	that	contains	enough	information	to	extract	everything	one	might	need.		Whatever	its	other	merits,	this	kind	of	proposal	is	irrelevant	in	the	current	theoreti-cal	context,	and	this	is	so	for	two	reasons.	The	first	is	theoretical.	As	noted	above,	struc-
																																																								37	Alternatively,	instead	of	identifying	compositional	semantic	content	in	a	context	with	the	hor-izontal,	one	might	define	it	as	a	function	from	pairs	of	worlds	to	truth	values,	where	the	first	el-ement	of	the	pair	is	the	world	of	the	utterance,	and	second	the	world	of	evaluation,	that	is	(ig-noring	other	potential	features	of	context):	
SC-S*:	 	 	 𝜆𝑤. 𝜆𝑤′. 𝜑 !,!! 		
And	then	one	could	argue	that	assertoric	content	is	determined	as	follows:		
AC-S*:	 	 	 𝜆𝑤. 𝜑 !,! 	
Though	this	proposal	connects	the	two	types	of	content,	 it	suffers	from	the	problem	discussed	above.		AC-S*	 is	not	suited	to	play	the	role	of	assertoric	content	–	it	just	is	the	diagonal	content.	(Thanks	to	B.	Rabern,	p.c.)	
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tured	semantic	contents	(whether	we	call	 them	propositions	or	not)	are	not	composi-tional	semantic	contents	in	Lewis’s	sense.	They	do	not	compose	in	a	function-argument	sort	of	way	with	operators,	and	no	significant	semantic	composition	occurs	with	struc-tured	contents.	Thus,	to	reiterate,	structured	fine-grained	semantic	values	are	not	com-positional	semantic	values	in	the	sense	of	Dummett	and	Lewis.			 The	 second	 reason	 the	 proposal	 is	 irrelevant	 in	 this	 context	 is	 that,	 even	 setting	aside	 the	 aforementioned	 worry,	 the	 proposal	 does	 not	 vindicate	 the	 distinction	 be-tween	assertoric	 and	 compositional	 semantic	 contents.	According	 to	Dummett,	Evans,	and	Stanley,	assertoric	content	plays	the	role	of	the	object	of	propositional	attitudes	and	assertion,	 and	 semantic	 contents	 are	 compositional	 semantic	 values.	 The	 two	notions	are	distinct,	and	so,	any	defense	of	the	tradition	must	exhibit	a	compositional	semantic	value,	on	the	one	hand,	and	a	suitable	object	of	the	attitudes,	on	the	other.	But	the	pro-posal	under	consideration	does	not	do	this	–	it	promises	a	single	object	as	an	amalgama-tion	 of	 both,	 rather	 than	 two	 somehow	 related.	 Even	 if	 in	 the	 end	 this	were	 right,	 it	would	 not	 count	 as	 a	 vindication	 of	 the	Dummett-Evans-Stanley	 position.	 In	 fact,	 this	approach,	far	from	salvaging	the	Dummet-Evans-Stanley	position,	is	in	essence	another	vindication	of	Identification.			 To	sum	up,	if	assertoric	and	semantic	contents	are	to	be	connected,	yet	distinct,	they	cannot	be	Lewisean,	diagonal	or	structured	propositions,	or	Chalmers’	 rich	structured	contents.			
5. Conclusion	
I	argued	that	anyone	who	challenges	 Identification	must	still	provide	some	sort	of	ac-count	of	how	semantic	and	assertoric	contents	are	connected,	and	in	this	regard,	I	fur-ther	 argued,	 the	 tradition	 from	 Dummett	 and	 Evans	 continued	 by	 Stanley	 fails:	 the	
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straightforward	way	of	establishing	the	connection	proposed	by	Lewis	is	unavailable	to	them,	as	well	as	any	plausible	alternative.	Thus,	Stanley’s	attack	on	the	Rigidity	Thesis	is	unsuccessful.	This	failure,	however,	points	to	a	deeper	problem	with	Stanley’s	notion	of	assertoric	content.	No	plausible	notion	of	content	can	play	the	role	of	Stanley’s	assertor-ic	content	if	it	is	to	be	related	to	compositional	semantic	content,	as	it	must	be	if	the	two	contents	are	to	play	an	explanatory	role	in	a	theory	of	communication.		In	particular,	the	assertoric	content	cannot	be	Lewisean	assertoric	content,	a	horizontal	proposition,	or	a	diagonal	proposition,	or	a	structured	proposition,	or	some	other	type	of	rich	structured	content.		There	 is	a	broader	moral	here.	Many	reasons	have	been	advanced	 for	positing	dif-ferences	between	the	semantic	contents	of	uttered	sentences	and	what	these	utterances	communicate	–	not	just	based	on	considerations	of	operators,	but	also	based	on	those	of	context-sensitivity.	But	 for	a	 semantic	 theory	 to	play	a	 role	 in	an	account	of	 linguistic	communication,	the	semantic	contents	it	assigns	to	sentences	must	bear	some	clear	re-lation	to	what	 is	communicated	by	them.	In	the	 literature	on	context-sensitivity,	some	theorists	hold	that	the	semantic	contents	of	uttered	sentences	are	related	to	what	they	communicate	via	saturation	(Soames,	2008).	Others	hold	positions	according	to	which	semantic	contents	are	propositions,	and	what	is	communicated	are	sets	of	propositions	(Cappelen	and	Lepore,	2005).	Here	too	one	might	raise	worries	about	whether	a	tight	enough	connection	has	been	forged	between	semantic	and	assertoric	contents	to	justify	the	value	of	the	semantic	project.	Often	the	mechanisms	by	which	a	connection	is	estab-lished	are	left	inexplicit	or	are	otherwise	unconstrained.	Pending	a	clear	account	of	the	connection,	as	well	as	a	clear	account	of	 the	two	types	of	content,	any	such	theory	re-mains	less	than	satisfactory.		
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